The Linacre Quarterly
Volume 44 | Number 1

February 1977

A "Natural Law" Reconsideration of Euthansia
Lisa Sowle Cahill

Follow this and additional works at: http://epublications.marquette.edu/lnq
Recommended Citation
Cahill, Lisa Sowle (1977) "A "Natural Law" Reconsideration of Euthansia," The Linacre Quarterly: Vol. 44 : No. 1 , Article 8.
Available at: http://epublications.marquette.edu/lnq/vol44/iss1/8

Article 8

At the same time , a comparison of treatments, or of treatment with no further curative
treatments, is objectively relativ~
to the patient's present condition - not to som e notion of
"standard medical care" in a
physician 's mind . A routinized
understanding of "ordinary /extraordinary" is th e "security
blanket of som e physicians who
nevertheless have been known to
call some ethicists " absolutists"!
In this article I have been concerned simply with the clarification of terms, to th e end that the
prohibition of euthanasia can be
more fully understood. This is a
firm principle or moral norm
that should govern medical care.
I myself have suggested that
there m ay be "exceptions" to
t he rule against hastening or
causing or . ch oosing death. 11 A
littl e flurry of debate once
~wirled around those exceptions.
1 do not now enter the lists to
defend them. My point has rather been a far m ore important
one, against the trend that is
clearly evident in contemporary
discussions to weaken the principle prohibiting choosing d~a~h.
Ldose language, I believe, 1s Its
source.
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After reviewing both traditional teaching and traditional Christian thinking on positive euthanasia, the author attempts to establish a Christian basis for positive euthanasia in highly selected
circumstances. The author and
editor publish this with the intention of inviting comment
rather than settling an issue.
Ms. Cahill is a member of the
religion department of Boston
College.
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Respe ct for the value of
Some of the moral uncertainty
human life and care for its preswhich surrounds our current perervation in a state of physical
ceptions of the relation of the
Well -being have traditionally
sick to the healthy (especially to
motivated the practice of medimembers of the health care procine in Western societies. Because
fessions) and to alternative
of the relatively recent but very
courses of treatment, might be
lapid advancement of medical
alleviated by careful reflection
technology, it has become comupon the meaning of "the sancmonplace to observe that the
tity of life" and its implications
Proper affirmation of that refor action. Difficult questions
8pect and the adequate fulfill about life and d eath ought to be
ment of that care are perplexing
considered in light of the totality
ethical issues. It is often no easy
of the human person to whom
matter for the physician to deterthis principle h as reference. Biollline how best to honor his oblilogical life is said to be "sacred"
gation "to render service to
because it is a fundamental conhUJnanity with full respect for
dition of human meaning. But
the dignity of man. " 1
physical existence is not an ab-
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solute value for the human person. What are some conflict situations in which other values are
foremost? What kinds of acts are
compatible both with respect for
life and with the recognition that
it is not an absolute? Ought direct euthanasia or "mercy-killing" always to be excluded from
such acts, even in cases of severe
terminal suffering or permanent
unconsciousness?
The conviction that human
life has a value and commands
respect not comparable to that
of lower forms of life can be expre~sed variously and rests upon
a broad base of support from
diverse ethical traditions. The
Judaeo-Christian communities
have endorsed the principle of
the sanctity of life because it is
consistent with a religious belief
in a God Who creates and preserves human life, and Who imposes a moral obligation of life
to life, consisting in its preservation and protection. The Roman
Catholic tradition of Christianity
in particular has attempted in the
realm of medical ethics to supply
this rather abstract principle with
appropriate moral content. Only
God has full "dominion" or right
of control over human life; man's
dominion over his own life is
limited. "God is the creator and
master of human life and no one
may take it without His authorization."2 Although religious belief in a Divine Maker Who loves
and sustains personal life provides a strong warrant · for respect, the principle of the sanctity of life can also be defended
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on philosophical grounds, b
appeal to common human e
ience. Many an atheisti
agnostic humartist .would
that since life is the fundarr
and irreplaceable conditic
the experience of all huma
ues, it is a basic , or the
value and must not be des t
without grave cause.3

an
1eror
ree
1tal
of
val.sic,
yed

In · Catholic medicaJ oral
theology, the principle
the
sanctity of life has been a f med
not only because it is com tible
with biblical anthropolog . but
because it is part of the
~ural
moral law. As such, it ind tes a
universal ethical o bl tion,
known to all men and
men,
not to Christians only . • the
natural law moral thea r,y of
Catholicism, the princi ' has
been given two primary xpressions, one negative and " ' positive. First, we may cons ~r the
negative prohibition of t violation or destruction of l ' , patterned on Thomas f. Jinas's
arguments against murd .4 It is
often formulated as, "It i :liways
wrong directly to kill . inno·
cent human being."5 "lis has
been the basis for the " 'lurch's
stance against abortion .1S murder) and euthanasia (as s ,cide or
murder or both) .6 Sec nd, we
have the positive affirm ·1tion of
respect for the integrity of
human personhood , als o roo~d
in Aquinas.? It is called "th e pnn·
ciple of totality," the stand~d
medical formulation of which
proclaims the proper subordina·
tion of an organ to the good ~f.
the body as part to wh o le. ThiS
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affinnation of the value of life
has provided a framework within
which to justify surgical mutilation of the body (e.g., excision
of a diseased organ) in order to
further its total well-being.s The
intention of the principle of
totality is to respect and safeguard the integrity and welfare
of the whole human being.
The referent of the principle
of totality has usually been the
life of the human individual considered as a physical organism.
However, it can be argued that
tJ_te fullest meaning of this prinCiple, as it is actually used by
Catholic theologians writing on
medical ethics, includes the subordination of the physical aspect
of man to the whole "person"
which also includes his spiritual
aspect.
During his pontificate, Pius XII
addressed himself repeatedly to
contemporary problems of ethics
~nfronting the medical profesSions. These teachings are significant both because they are ex~ressions of "natural law" thinklllg about medical morality and
because they were promulgated
~ authoritative (although not
infallible) for mem hers of the
Catholic Church. The principle
~ ~tality is frequently used in
Us s analyses of the medical:o~ ~ssu~ of which he speaks,
d 1t Is h1s formulations of that
~ciple which are most often
~Yoked by Catholic theologians.
knUs XII delivered a now wellown speech on medical re~arch to the First International
hgress of the Histopathology

of the Nervous System convened
in Rome on September 13, 1952.
Therein he declared that since
" the parts exist for the whole;• it
is true of any physical entity that
"the whole is a determining factor f o r the part and can dispose
of it in its own interest."9 Therefore, " the patient can allow the
individual parts to be destroyed
or mutilated when and to the
extent necessary for the good of
his being as a whole."lO
Consideration of the principle
of totality in its abstract version
leads us to ask whether the " totality" of a p erson's "being as a
whole" can be adequately defined in terms of the "physical
organism" here mentioned by
Pope Pius XII. On the contrary,
Catholic teaching does in fact
provide a strong basis for describing human personhood as a totality which is essentially constituted by the integration of both
physical and spiritual aspects.
The Pope himself states in his encyclical The Mystical Body of
Christ that " the whole of man"
is not "encompassed within the
organism of our mortal body ."11
Perhaps his most forthright
statement on the matter is given
in an address to the International
College of Psychoneuropharmacology on September 9, 1958.
Speaking of medical experimentation, the Pope affirmed that
" there must be added to the suba rd in at ion of the individual
organs to the organism and its
end the subordination of the
organism itself to the spiritual
end of the person."12
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An expanded and perhaps
more technical version of the
Pope's view of human personhood is given in a 1958 address
to a Congress of the International Ass o c iation of A pplied
Psychology. The self is explicitly described as a "totality"
having "parts." Says Pius, "We
define personality as 'the psychosomatic unity of man in so far as
it is determined and governed by
the sou l ' .. . . " 13 Thus in an
address to the International
Union Against Cancer, in 1956,
the Pope feels constrained to
warn that "before anything else,
t he doctor should consider the
whole man, in the unity of his
person , that is to say, not merely
his physical condition but his
psychological state as well as his
spiritual and moral ideals and his
place in society. "14 The question to be· asked is whether Pius's
strong concern for the " whole
man" is consistent with his abso1u te prohibition of euthanasia.15 If the body is a "part" of
the total person, are t here any
circumstances in which it may,
through a direct act, be sacrificed
for the good of the whole? This
pro b 1em will bear reflection
which. goes beyond the past prohibitions of such acts.
Considering Life and Death
It is certainly essential to a
Thomistic version of Roman
Catholic moral theology to consider human life and d eath in
view of the final end of the human person. Con sequently , it
would seem most inconsistent
50

for any theologian wh o sten·
sibly stands within that tr~ ition
t o in te rpret moral d il nmas
according to· a principle f hu·
man "totality " which r ~lects
not only :rp.an 's supematm goal,
but his nat ural goal of ature
rit. It
integration of b ody and
is this to tal human n atur .vhich
contemporary Catholic
leologians want to give its pre 'r due
edical
in · co nsiderat ions of
ethics. This concern is elated
specifically to the pra ce of
medicine in the curren . ;thical
and R e ligious Direc1 ' S {or
Catholic Health Faciliti. which
maintains that a Catha • hospital has a " responsibilit \ o seek
and protect the total g' l of its
t just a
patients." This good is
physical one. "The tot< !OOd of
the patient, which int des his
as his
high~r spiritual as wt
bodily welfare, is th ~ primaiY
concern of those entrt. .d with
the management of ~ 'atholic
health facility." 16 Kiel 1 Nolan,
a priest and theologiru nvolved
in pastoral care of th· 'iick, re·
minds us that if eutha1 .sia is to
be morally acceptable. must be
a sign of "the deep ..;hristian
respect for the in teg1 v of the
individual." 17 Accord t :: to the
positive sen se o f t he -..: '1 ctity of
life principle, th e gcv d of the
totality of an individu ,; 's human
personhood must be foremost in
all d eliberations abou t his welfare and the obligations of others
to him in his living and his dying.
As Nolan sign ificantly puts it,
"The Christian con cern must be
to provide for hum an survival
Lin acre QuarterlY

and not for m ere biological preservation ."18
Why is it that the protection
of biological life is usually con-

dren . He states that life is to be
preserved only insofar as it can
ground the highest human good
of loving relationships with other
persons. A meaningful life is one
in which the individual has relational consciousness and is free
from physical pain or suffering
so severe that the sheer effort to
survive distracts th e p erson from
the primary human good, love.21

sidered to be an essential factor
in respect for the whole human
person? Both the negative and
the positive versions of the sanctity of life principle express an
insight into the human " right" to
life and the concomitant human
"duty" to protect it. An individBecause the Christian affirms
ual is not to be unjustly deprived
the transcendence of full human
of his life, and, furthermore, his
personhood over sheer biological
total personal well-being is to be
existence, life is for him never an
promoted. These insights are
absolute value, a value to be salbased on the judgment that life is
vaged at all costs. Sometimes
the fundamental condition of all
continued life does not constiother human values and is theretute a good for a certain individfore to be preserved itself insofar
ual because it cannot offer him
as it can ground t h ose values.
the conditions of meaningful perThe foremost human value is the
sonal existence. Sometimes the ·
love of God achieved at least in
continued life of an individual is
Part through love of other perincompatible with th e preservasons. This Christian view of the
tion of other values which also
meaning of life as the condition
claim protection. In such inof personal love has been given
stances, the Christian does not
consistent expression in the condeny that human life is a value to
text of Catholic medical ethics.
be respected. However, h e real~us XII, in " The Prolongation of
izes that under the finite and sinLife," mentions the ultimacy of
ful conditions of historical moral
a "higher, m o r e important
choice, he is called upon responIOOd," the good of love for God ,
sibly to mediate between conover bodily life .19 Thomas J.
flicting values and the rights and
O'Donnell, S.J., observes t hat life
duties which are devolved from
18 a "relative good" is valuable
them. Occasions of moral choice
because it is a con text for other
do not always involve clear-cut
Yalues which contribute to the
issues and alternatives neatly or~absolute good ," man 's pursuit ganized into a hierarchy of
Ill charity of h is supernatural
ethical preferability .22 While this
~· God.2D Recently, Richard
does n ot remove from us th e
McCormick, S.J., has emobligation to ch oose, it does
p 0 Yed a very similar line of arguforestall false confidence in the
lllent in discussing the life prosfinality of particular m oral judgPects of defective newborn chilm ents and in the abilit y of t h e

l
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moral agent to avoid responsibility for the undesirable consequences of a difficult moral
choice. At times, decisions about
life and death necessitate arbitration among competing values
which cannot all be actualized in
a given instance.
Classical examples of ethical
dilemmas in which this reality
must be acknowledged are war,
self-defense, and capital punishment. In these three cases, the
" right to life" of one individual
conflicts with the right of another individual, or even of the community, to life itself, or to the
pursuit of goods still more valuable than life, for which life may
be sacrificed. If we recall the
standard prohibition of killing,
we will observe that each instance can be exempted from the
range of the prohibition because
the object of the act of direct
killing can be said in some sense
not to be " innocent."23
Even the lives of the innocent,
however, are not absolutely inviolable goods. In consistence
with its concern for the "total
good" of the person, the Catholic moral tradition affirms that
preservation of the life of even
the just man is sometimes not
the highest value to be maintained in a situation of conflict.
It is clear, however, that in the
past only indirect killing of the
innocent has been considered to
be justifiable. For instance, the
martyr may allow his physical
welfare to be negated in order to
testify to the highest good of
love for God in Christ. Here the
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individual permits (but d s not
directly cause) his own c tth in
order to protect a greatP value.
medThe frequent' distinction
ical ethics between "or nary"
means of life support (a!' 1andatory) and "extraordinary means
(as elective) is given sim r warrants. Death may be p n itted
with(or " indirectly caused ")
i
o
not
holding treatments whic
serve the best interest~ >f the
patient. According to th urrent
definition, a means is n c .:> bligauntain
tory if it is difficult to
or u se, or if it will pro! ly not
offer much benefit to tb )atient
in terms of either q · ity or
duration of life. A t at ment
need not be used if it ·ill not
·e to a
restore an individual's
state in which it can su .ort the
development of life '• highest
(spiri-tual) goods or VI< ch will
prevent it from furnisl 1g such
support in the future . ~ On the
other hand, a human te is in·
deed worth prolonging f it can
provide an opportunit~ ,o enjoy
forgetfulness of self i1 love of
others. Personal relatiof' are that
for the sake of which li , is to be
sustained.
Direct/Indirect Causes <)f Death
When an innocen t pe• so n is in·
volved, an act of killi ng falls out·
side the sphere of effica('y of_ th_e
sanctity of life prohibition If 1~
may be described as "indirec t · "25
The martyr neither wills n~r
directly causes his own death ; 1t
is an undesired consequence of
his steadfast faith comm itment.
Similarly, to omit t o provi·de
extraordinary life support to a
Linacre Q uarterlY

patient is no t to directly cause
his death , but to permit it to
occur as a result of disease. The
decision is made in light of the
judgment that the active pursuit
of life's continuation is not consistent with concern for and protection of the total welfare of
that person. His right to life and
the physician's concomitant duty
to preserve it must, in this particular instance of confli ct, be subordinated to his "right to die. "
Life for ·him no longe r provides
the sufficient conditions for the
fruitful development of loving
relationships, both with other
humans, and through them, with
God. When extraordinary or ultimately useless treatments are
not used, recognition is given to
the patient's right to be freed
from physical and spiritual deterioration and suffering and to
the physician's duty to care for
his patient's physical well-being
within the larger context of
human personhood. This is not
to say that the patient no longer
has a right to life or that he may
be deprived of his life against his
Will or for the good of any other
~rson or of society. Both the
right to life and the right to
death must be subsumed under
the promotion of the welfare of
the whole human person himself.
In situations where the values of
life and of death conflict, the
Patient or his proxy may prefer
to exercise voluntarily the right
to die as most appropriate to the
Patient's own total well-being.

"Respect"

may be shown to a
Person both by acting in ways

which express esteem for his or
h er dignity and by not acting in
ways which express contemp t for
or indifference to his or h e r digni ty. What does "resp ect for life"
as an ethical principle now mean ,
demand, require in choices about
death in medical practice? There
is consensus in theological ethics
(though pe rhaps not always in
medicine) that respect for life
does not always entail its indefinite prolongation. Sometimes
respect is most adequately conveyed by a refusal to intervene or
to continue intervention in the
progress of the human organism
toward biological death. This is
the main argument of Pius XII in
"The Prolongation of Life" ; it is
not a new one in Christian or
philosophical ethics.
The "hard question" remains
and at this juncture unrelentingly
confronts us : Can respect ever
mean direct intervention to end
the life of a patient? (We now
move from the consideration of
the morality of an act of omission to that of one of commission, to use the technical language of moral theology.) It is
clear that the magisterial Roman
Catholic rejoinder to this specific
question has been negative. 26
Life-sustaining treatments may
be omitted, but death may not
be hastened directly. It must
now be asked whether this position in fact m eets the test of consistency with other values explicitly upheld and protected by
the Church, such as the value of
the dignity and welfare of the
whole human person.
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It will be recalled that the
sanctity of life principle in Catholic theology has been given two
ethically normative expressions.
Its prohibitive form supplies warrants for condemning voluntary
euthanasia. Its affirmative form
supplies warrants for respecting
and promoting the integrity of
the individual. But can both of
these conclusions from the more
generally valid principle of respect for life be observed together in every particular situation? Can the obligation not to
cause death directly and the obligation to respect the goods and
proper goals of human personhood ever be in conflict? If a
conflict should arise in medical
practice, which obligation should
be given preference on the basis
that it best fulfills the grounding
principle of life's sanctity?
Let us consider a possible case,
one which is very frequently
mentioned in discussion of
euthanasia because it appropriately frames decision-making
about causing death in a context
of personal agony, both for the
performer and the recipient of
the act. A patient with terminal
cancer is in "the dying process."27 The best medical judgment offers a prognosis of only a
few days' life. He is undergoing
extreme personal suffering, involving both physical and "spiritual " aspects. Bodily pain is
intimately related to mental
stress, to one's total outlook on
life and to one's ability to make
the most of biological existence
as the condition for fully human
54

meaning, centered on p ,onal
relationships . The physic; pam
of our patient cannot bt ·ffec;e of
tively alleviated by the
analgesics (this may be ither
because of . the nature of ; particular disease, or becaus1 r the
state of m edical practict 1 the
locale in which he is r •iving
and
treatment). The integr
maturity of p ersonality \ ch he
has acquired as the gor ) f his
lifetime thus far is slippi• rapidly away as he endures th emorysical
alizing experience of
and mental deteriorat 1. He
which
acknowledges that the I
was once a good to hi1 s now
. He is
approaching its conclus
reconciled to death anc erhaps
an exhopes for peace or joy
t-Ie
reistence beyond death
hasten
quests that his physici
his progress toward a t h and
out of his unbearable ffering.
ne not
He asks that this be
only out of mercy, bt out of
respect for his claim tt reedom
from severe threats to h ,Jersonal
integrity and to the acJ evement
without undue delay 1 the appropriate goal of this r· w dying
life.
The first objections n ich will
be raised against a r .ysician's
compliance with this n 1uest will
be directed at the very .,ossibility
of describing a case in these
terms. Some will argue hat there
is always chance of a ~ rong diagnosis; examples are recounted of
"miracle recoveries" in which an
unexplained remission ensued
upon the diagnosis of a '' hopeleSS
case" of cancer. Anyone who
Linacre QuarterlY

reflects upon human moral experience must grant the fallibility
of all creaturely decision-making.
Human persons must act, nonetheless,.. o~ the basis of strong
pro?abihties, acknowledging that
W~Jle outside possibilities do
exJst, they do not provide a
reasonable basis for action in the
face of far more persuasive evidence.
Other Objections
Others' may object that no

hu~an being ever has a true
deSire to die, and with the assistance of a supportive medical
team and family, will cherish
even the last few hours of his or
her existence. Elisabeth KublerR~ss, M.D., has offered plentiful
evidence on the basis of clinical
experience that terminal patients
are able to achieve acceptance of
an~ readiness for death .28 When
t~Js information is combined
With an appreciation of the fact
~at .critical suffering cannot in
Circumstances be alleviated
on ·
,
il e IS abl~ to envision more ready a patient who desires d eath
~r he has realistically assessed
IS prospects for human fulfill:en~ during the short span left
hJm. Although most patients
lllay be able to live meaningfully
:en during terminal illness·, this
not negate the responsibil~ to consider the situation of
e one who is not able to do so.

·:S

e The moral character of such a
...-~ admittedly exceptional in
...
4l<hcal
'
ined
. prac t Ice,
may be examlions m_ terms of the two expres01 the sanctity of life print
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ciple . The first furnishes the traditional prohibition, which describes voluntary euthanasia as
d'
a
Irect act to kill a man (oneself
or another) who is "innocent. "29
If one views the moral act through
the lens of this principle, the
?nly .legitimate killing is that
m wh1ch either the term "direct"
does not apply to the act or the
term "innocent" does not apply
to the object of euthanasia.30
Th.is is certainly not to say that a
dymg patient is "guilty. " The
real question to be considered is
whether the context of innocence ~~ guilt is an appropriate
one Withm which to ponder the
moral character of voluntary
euthanasia.

How ought we to interpret the
negative phrasing of the natural ·
law command to protect the
individual's right to life? In
Thomas, the adjective "innocent" refers primarily to the man
who is " righteous" in the sense
that he has not forfeited his right
to. life so that he may . be depnved of it by lawful authority.
To have lost one's innocence
means to have injured the common good.31 · Thus the command
not to kill the innocent seems
f~ndame?tally to be a prohibitiOn agamst the deprivation of
another's life against his will unless that other has somehow' forfeited his right to protection .
The phrasing of this prohibition
envisions correlative exceptions
such as war, capital punishment
and self-defense. The terms of
the prohibition make an awkward context within which to
55

..

approach suicide and euthanasi~,
where the "innocent" person 1s
willing.32
More importantly, since in the
latter cases the argument is made
that death is in the better interests of the person, the language
of "innocence" vs. guilt, forfeiture, and deprivation is not really
applicable. The "innocent" man
is one whose rights, among them
the "right to life," must be respected. What about a~o.ther
right also belonging to the nghteous man" leading a Godoriented moral life, the "right to
death"? Sometimes this right
contravenes the importance of
the first right. When this is so, it
makes little sense to apply the
word "innocent" out of its original context of forfeiture and
punishment. The individual may
be "inno·cent" in the sense of
· "legally or morally blameless,"
but what is the moral relevance
of this fact?
It can be granted that the
dying individual is innocent.
However, it is the duty of those
who care for and about him to
consider that with which he has a
tight to be provided, as well as
that of which he has a right not
to be deprived. There may exist a
positive duty to support his desire to die, if no conflict exists
with other overriding rights and
duties. The central problems are
deciding, first, whether the duty
to sustain life or the duty to end
life is in the concrete case more
important, and second; what are
the morally legitimate means of
upholding the predominant right.
56

In care of the sick, the o blif ttion
to prolong life is foremosi until
that point at which an ir livid·
ual's life no ·longer offers t him
or her the opportunity t nur·
ture relationships as life's !ntral
endeavor. It has tradit •nally
been gran ted that "h Jeless
cases" have, in such • :cum·
stances, a right to die " ich it
may be the duty of o t ~rs to
support by withholding c with·
drawing extraordinary m ;ms· of
treatment. Can the righ co die ·
ever justify direct killing' )oes a
terminal p~tient have a ght to
death which in some case entails
>se en·
a duty on the part of
trusted with his care t hasten
positively its arrival?
Principle of Life's Sa

tity

This brings the d isc1 ,ion to
the affirmative expressi · of the
principle of life's sanc t Y· What
does it mean to respec1 tnd pro·
teet the life of a dyin person?
First, Kieran Nolan ha s ··marked
that a patient in the l ,t phas~s
of a terminal illness m · " be said
to be oriented toward death. as
the appropriate goal of '1is exist·
ence, just as the he .. lthy are
appropriately orien tee· ~ow~~
continued life.33 Death IS ~
the natural end of the biologtcal
organism. Although the de~th 0~
a human as a person a! bemg
not a good in itself, it still ma~
be understood as a mediate ~
. .s t'1an dill
necessary goal of the Chn.
his hope for eternal life m ~ 0
Secondly the terminal patien
who may' be a cand idate for
..
euthanasia is one who is suffenng
both physically and sp irituallY or

t
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even "morally" in the sense of
proximity to sin. In the first
place, personal integration is
threatened with degeneration.
Physical pain, accompanied by
mental exhaustion or sedation,
often makes it difficult to sustain
a vital concern for the needs of
loved family memb ers and
friends. Furthermore, as Pius XII
has stated, "suffering can also
furnish occasion for new faults."34
Nolan concurs that prolonged
physical-and mental torment can
conduce to rebellion against God
or despair.

Death for the Christian is
never an unambiguous good, but
it is sometimes a lesser evil than
the evil of suffering, and is for
the Christian a good in a limited
but positive sense.35 If in the
light of these considerations, it is
&greed that death is a good for a
Pll'ticular suffering and dying
P&tient here and now, and if
death will not follow quickly if
treatment is ended, then can voluntary euthanasia ever constitute
a legitimate moral option? From
the evidence thus far (evidence
1rhich must be verified in every
case from consideration of the
lituation of a particular individual), it would seem so. Life is not
~value to be preserved absolute·¥· Sometimes it must yield to
~!eater values. If death is for this
Person the better alternative
there exists sufficient reason fo;
~in~ it.36 Deliberately-caused
-.th 1S not so great an evil that
it can never be outweighed by
lh!ater goods.

The usual and most wellfounded argument against voluntary euthanasia in even exceptional cases is made in terms of
social consequences. It is not
based on the alleged immorality
of the individual act. The act
itself may be conceded to result
in desirable consequences for the
patient, consequences which it
would, in fact, be the responsibility of others to hasten directly,
were it not for the evil long-range
effects of such an act. However,
it is argued that it is wrong to
commit any act which, while
good in itself, would lead to
eventual consequences whose evil
character would be disproportionate to the initial good. This
venerable rejoinder is called the
"wedge argument," a contempo-.
rary proponent of which is
Richard McCormick.37
McCormick agrees with those
who are convinced that "the
direct causing of death involves
dangers, especially for the living,
not associated with conservative
procedures .... "38 Thus he gives
a "prudential validity" to a rule
against euthanasia of a "virtually
exceptionless" sort. Direct killing
as a premoral evil would be justified were there sufficient reason,
but the reasons in favor of euthanasia in concrete cases are outbalanced by the reasons against
instituting euthanasia as a general
practice. McCormick believes
that an immediate act, perhaps
morally justifiable " in itself," is
to be refrained from because of
consequences such as an attitu57

...

dina! decrease in mercy and sensitivity on the part of the hospital staff, or the ambiguities inherent in the procedures of ascertaining con sent, etc.
This argument is a forceful
one, but it need n ot signal the
end of the discussion . Although
McCormick has enumerated real
dangers, h e has not eradicated
the problem with which any propo sed wedge argument must
deal, i.e. , whether the long-term
effects of an act ought to have
the same moral importance as
the immediate effects of an act.
In cases where the latter are very
ce rtain and unavoidable, the
former may be relatively uncertain b ecaus e further moral
choices (by others who share
responsibility) will have to intervene in order either to actualize
or to prevent the anticipated
·danger.
Traditional Catholic morals
have held that it is always wrong
to cause a moral evil in order to
achieve a moral good or to prevent another m oral evil even if it
is greater. We also have a responsibility to try to avoid even that
moral evil for which we are n ot
directly responsible. Some ethicists have suggested t hat, at least
in some cases, to refuse to hasten
the death o f a grossly suffering
terminal patient is to permit, if
not cause, in extreme cases, a
moral evil - the despair of the
dying man or woman.39 Even in
less severe cases, there is freque ntly present the clear spiritual, or personal, evil of mental
ennervation and distress, and of
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inability to escape the c i
suffering which encloses f
its all efforts to transcend
in concern for others. Th:
moral evil in th e sense
but it is a clear disvalue
whole human person <
posed of both body and ·
It is a violation of the
and m eaning of human e2

le of
I lim·

teself
s not
sin,
'r the
com·
)irit."
rpose
.ence.

t ween
Aquinas distinguishes
a certain and an uncerta moral
evil; ther e exists a greate ~spon ·
sibility to avoid the fon r than
eutha·
the latter. 40 In the case
')SSible
n asia, there are two
dangers of moral evil , tr to the
•t per·
patient if the act is
formed, and that to fu tt gener·
ations if it is performec1 n addition , there is the m ar• ealistic
threat to personality, r fully
persqnal spirit, not to 1ention
degenthe physical evil of bod
e
of an
eration. D oes the avoid;
,ctually
un certain future evi 1
constitute a proportion. . reason
for permitting a pr€' 1 t evil,
which , while of much arrower
scope, is of much gr- ter certainty? Is the failure tC' avoid an
immediate moral evil , tch as a
loss of faith in the ·ultimate
meaning of life, or e 1 excru·
ciating and prolongeP spiritual
and physical evil , sue· as con·
scious suffering or ut onsciou_s
dege n erat ion, sufficier d y justified by the "proportwnate rea·
son " of avoidance of the danger
(not the certainty) of future
moral evil ? In fact, this future
evil seems more than the present
one to be described most accurately as " p ermitted" rather
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than "caused." This is to say that
our moral responsibility for t he
attitudes toward death of fu t ure
physicians, etc., is more indirect
than is our resp onsibility for the
total personal distress (moral,
mental, and physical) of our
neighbor suffering here and now
and imm ediately dependent
upon our care.
I believe the usual criticism of
the wedge argu men t has force
against its use in the condemnation of euthanasia. The opp osing
contention is th at each act must
~ judged right or wr ong primar~ly _in itself and only secondarily
m Its relation to other acts. " In
itself" does indeed include effects, and it is admittedly difficult t o draw a line around the
more " immediate" o nes. But the
range of effects of an act cannot
be extended indefinitely o r the
very meaning of a discrete "occasion of m oral ch oice" is dissipated to t h e point of disappearance.

In addition , th e social effects
of the wedge will more likely be
cut short where there is a standard by which to differentiate t he
first case from other similar but
m_o rally distinct cases. 41 The
ltipulation that a candidate for
euthanasia be "in the dying process" is such a standard and a
relat_ively clear one, tho~gh its
lpphcation is not in every case
~~~~-~ly unambiguous. There is a
lllarked difference between
~hanasia for those dying and in
and eu_thanasia for t he sick
not dymg, for th e socially
11
leless, for th e insane, etc. ,

:n

which can be judged by a relatively objective standard. Where
such a criterion is available we
must at least say that the " fu ture
danger" becom es m ore " uncertain." Anothe r standard is t he
one McCorm ick offers as a justification for permitting death to
occur, that of relational consciou sness. Such a standard
might apply also th e p atient with
a grossly damaged neocortex,
whose vital functions are still
maintained spontaneously by the
brainstem . The prolonged and
meaningless physical d eterioration of a permanently com atose
individual can be construed as an
insult to his or her total personhood. In such a case, as well as
that of the dying person, euthanasia may present a viable moral
option. Once a patient is in the ·
terminal stage of a fatal illness or
is permanently comatose, it may
become evident that his or h er
life is past the point of possible
restoration to a quality which
would support significant pursuit
of the highest human values.
Christian Respect for Life
Thi s discussion of m oral
responsibilities of and toward the
dying does not represen t a comprehensive grasp of the problem
bu t ra t her an indication of
appropriate ways to t hink about
it. Through a consideration of
Christian respect for th e sanctity
o f human life, which is ultimately a concern for the good of th e
total person , I have tried to indicate that some relatively limited number of cases may constitute an arena of moral choice
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about euthanasia. 42 Life can fail
to constitute a sufficient condition for the fulfillment of human
value in either the presence of
gross suffering or the absence of
consciousness. These circumstances are predictably permanent if one is in the dying process or is irretrievably braindamaged. It is at this point that
the prospect of a choice about
euthanasia arises. Such choices
would involve only terminal or
comatose patients for whom it is
impossible to continue to pursue
those human values for which
the Creator intended life to serve
as the condition. Every such
choice must be informed by an
authoritative respect for the dignity of human life as God's
image and by the intent to protect that dignity. It is essential to
remember that no such choices
can be free-from ambiguity, since
death is never an unambiguous
good. In particular, it is necessary to repudiate any attempt to
define circumstances in which
there always exists a moral obligation to perform an act of
euthanasia. There is no definable
"class" of patients for whom
eu,thanasia is the only morally
responsible alternative.
Most importantly, it must be
made clear that there weighs on
the community of fellow human
beings, of which the dying
patient is a member, the obligation to exhaust every resource in
an effort to make the last phase
of that patient's life positively
meaningful. This obligation especially impinges upon the
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Christian, if love is in an~ >ense
to be taken as normative f1 conduct. At least it must t conceded that - euthanasia )Ught
always to be a final resort , ot an
option to be considered efore
all others have been expl ~d. It
goes without saying that uch a
stipulation ensures t hat at 1entic
candidates for euthanasi~ ·ill be
few. We may say with co1 de nee
that euthanasia would b e o rally
wrong where it is an a< which
deprives an individual c a real
opportunity to live wit 1 selfoffering relationships t c Jthers.
In such a case, euthanas would
not be in the best inter• of the
patient, since life coul be of
further value to him or t
In general, euthanasi s to be
avoided or rejected on 1e basis
of what is common!' termed
"the 'sanctity of life ~ '1Ciple."
Human life has an inhc• 1t claim
to respect. In certair circum·
stances, however, other onsider·
ations come into play ~· .ich may
influence persons to manifest
respect by causing d ...t h. Life
may cease, in some sen 2 , to be a
"good." It may inhib1t or prevent the pursuit of hun. an values
instead of providing conditions
conducive to their fu lf1ll ment. In
addition, the continuat ion and
development of a personal life
history may lose co nsiderable
w e ight as a real alternative
among others if terminal illness
promises to critically abbreviate
the life in question. A positive
"choice" to end life in such a
case is not a choice of significant·
continuation of life or of death
Linacre Quarterly

but a choice of immediate death
or of a wait for impending death.
In such situations, the positive
value of death may gain the
ascendancy over the negative
value, although both are always
co-present. It must be said that
euthanasia may not be justified
because death is ever a value,
right, or goal which can clearly
cancel out the value of life. It
must be said that euthanasia is
never justified because the obligation of the living to the dying,
or of the individual to attempt to
live meaningfully, is ever ended.
In the resolution of these confticts of value, the overriding
concern must be t he good of the
patient himself or herself, who is
the primary subject concerned.
When conditions preclude the
patient's voluntary selection of
an option, that selection must be
made on the basis of h is or her
own benefit and inferred interests. If these interests are asleSsed on the basis of a Christian
anthropology which views the
human being as a body-soul
entity, then the primary consideration in life and death decisions in medical practice will be
tbe good of the whole human
~on, not simply the perpetuat~on of physical existence. 43
8111ee the distinctive and controlling element of human nature is
the personal self or spirit, t hen
ICcording to the principle of
~ty, the body which is a
~" may in some cases be sac~lficed for the good of the
d~hol~" body-soul entity. Even
llect Intervention as a final op-

tion will not necessarily entail
diminishing communal protectiveness toward human life's
sanctity, if death is encompassed
reluctant ly and with a profound
(and Christian) reverence for the
personal existence within which
it is an event.
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